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Eﬃcient and Secure Stored-Value Cards with Leakage Resilience
Fuchun Guo∗, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo
Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW2522, Australia

Abstract
Stored-Value Cards (SVCs) are a kind of smartcards that can be used to store monetary values. SVCs have demonstrated a wide range of applications in commerce. SVCs are in general tamper-resistant, but they are very computationally weak and their security mechanisms are also weak against side-channel attacks. In this paper, we propose an
eﬃcient and secure stored-value card system. With the help of pre-computations, stored-value cards in our scheme
are only required to perform simple arithmetic operations and bitwise comparisons. Our system especially for SVCs
is secure with unbounded computational leakage resilience. Our novel scheme provides a practical solution to sidechannel attacks for light-weight devices.
Keywords: Stored-Value Cards, System Security, Weak Computation Capability, Side-Channel Attacks

1. Introduction
With strong demands on electronic payment services in commerce, Stored-Value Cards (SVCs) [1] have greatly
gained their popularity. SVCs are a kind of physical devices equipped with a computer chip. Diﬀering from debit
cards, SVCs directly store monetary values that have been purchased. The money in an SVC can be paid for a purchase
without the need of any online third party.
SVCs cannot handle complex computations. In practice, SVCs are very simple devices with a weak computing
processor. The nature of limited computation capability in SVCs rules out the feasibility of strong cryptography. It is
usually believed that they can only conduct light-weight cryptography. As a consequence, it causes various security
attacks. The recent attack [2] on Oyster cards is an example. Oyster cards are SVCs used in public transport services
in the United Kingdom. Recently, it has been shown that its cryptographic key can be obtained easily so that it can be
used to clone a card.
Side-channel attacks on secure hardware implementation have been becoming a major concern. Side-channel
attacks do not attack the computational properties on cryptographic algorithms, while they attack system implementation through such as electromagnetic analysis [3], power consumption analysis [4], timing analysis[5], and memory
analysis [6]. The most eﬀective side-channel attacks can extract cryptographic keys. Unfortunately, most cryptographic schemes are not leakage-resilient, and cannot be proven secure under side-channel attacks. Furthermore,
because SVCs are cheap devices, they cannot shield leakage [7, 8, 9] or adopt strong elliptic curve cryptography [10]
for leakage resilience.
Providing practical and eﬀective side-channel resistant security schemes for SVCs is a challenging task. In this
paper, we propose an eﬃcient security system for SVCs, which is secure against leakage from side-channel attacks.
The core of our scheme is a novel pre-computation scheme with the aid of message authentication codes [11] and
digital signatures [12, 13, 14]. Our scheme is very eﬃcient and provably secure with unbounded computational
leakage resilience.
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1.1. Related Work
Many secure electronic payments are invented over the past decades. There are online scenario (e.g.[15]) and
oﬄine scenario (e.g.[16, 17, 18]). In the online scenario, when a client pays to a merchant, it requires the third party
(e.g. bank) to complete money transaction. The debit card system falls into this scenario. In the oﬄine scenario,
money transactions from clients to merchants do not require any third party, and the stored-value card system falls
into this scenario.
Deﬁnitely, the oﬄine scenario provides a more ﬂexible money transaction compared to the online scenario. This
convenience, however, requires a more secure system since a dishonest client could double spend the same money
token. E-cash and e-wallet are two distinct approaches and secure payments for the oﬄine scenario.
E-cash was invented by Chaum [16] and has received lots of extensive studies (e.g. [17, 18]). In this system,
clients can withdraw money tokens and spend them in an anonymous way. If a client double spends a token, his
identity will be revealed. To be able to trace dishonest clients, it requires all clients to register their identities before
joining the e-cash system.
E-wallet was ﬁrst invented by Even and Goldreich [19], and it also receives many studies (e.g. [20, 21]). In
comparison with e-cash system, the e-wallet system utilizes tamper-resistant devices to prevent clients from double
spending. Clients do not need to register their identities before joining the system. In comparison with the e-cash
system, the e-wallet system receives a wide range of clients without the guarantee of credits.
The stored-value card is one of e-wallets. However, these e-wallet systems (i.e. [19, 20, 21]) require the wallet to
perform complex computations like exponentiations. The wallet therefore must be powerful enough to conduct heavy
computations. Another security issue is that most of previous e-wallet systems do not take side-channel attacks into
account. They could be insecure in the presence of side-channel attacks.
1.2. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose an eﬃcient and secure stored-value card system. The computations in stored-value cards
are very small, and our system for stored-value cards is secure with unbounded computational leakage resilience. In
comparison with existing systems for SVCs, our system signiﬁcantly improves both eﬃciency and security. They are
described in detail as follows.
• The stored-value cards in our system only conduct simple arithmetic operations and bitwise comparisons. These
computations are negligible compared to exponentiations/pairings in existing e-wallet systems. Therefore,
stored-value cards in our system can be light-weight equipped with cheap computer chips.
• The stored-value cards in our system do not need to shield any computation leakage in the presence of sidechannel attacks. Our system are secure with unbounded computational leakage resilience. Even all accessed
data in computation in stored-value cards are leaked to the adversary, the adversary still cannot break our system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and deﬁne stored-value card system.
In Section 3, we provide some preliminaries that are related to our scheme. In Section 4, we present our scheme in
detail. In Section 5, we analyze the security of our scheme. The ﬁnal section is our conclusion.
2. Stored-Value Card System
2.1. System Description
As shown in Figure 1, a stored-value card system consists of the entities of Issuer, Client, Server and Merchant,
and the devices of stored-value card C, top-up machine S and card reader R. They are described as follows:
• Issuer. This is the entity who generates parameters for stored-value cards, top-up machines, and card readers.
The issuer only involves in the setup of parameters, and is assumed to be a trusted party.
• Client. This is the entity who holds a stored-value card C to store monetary value. The stored-value card is assumed to be tamper-resistant, such that dishonest clients cannot break the device to extract sensitive information
stored in cards.
2

• Server. This is the entity who provides a top-up machine S for recharging stored-value cards. When S recharges
C, it generates an unforgeable recharge token and this token will recharge C successfully.
• Merchant. This is the entity who holds a card reader R. With this card reader, the merchant receives money
tokens, and collects money back from servers.

Figure 1: Stored-value card system.

2.2. Features of SVC System
The SVC system oﬀers the following two features:
The ﬁrst feature is no identity registration for clients. In the SVC system, diﬀerent from E-cash, clients do not
involve any cryptographic computation. All computations are secretly completed in stored-value cards. With storedvalue cards, clients interact with servers for recharging and with merchants for paying. They are not required to
respond any security issue; therefore, identity registration is not necessary.
The second feature is no third party for money transactions. When clients pay to merchants, the money transaction
is not completed by the third party in a centralized database but in stored-value cards and card readers. Precisely, a
stored-value card decreases its current balance and generates a money token; while a card reader veriﬁes the money
token and increases its current balance. All these computations do not involve any third party.
The above two features indicate that each stored-value card is uploaded with a secret key and unknown to clients.
As a consequence, stored-value cards must be tamper-resistant such that no adversary can tamper the device to get the
secret key; otherwise, it is impossible to achieve secure SVC system. For example, the adversary can forge money
token or change the current balance in SVCs. We also note that there have been some attacks [22] against tamper
resistance. The tamper resistance property however is essential for devices to securely store secret information. To
achieve a secure SVC system capturing the above two features, we believe or assume that tamper resistance is available
in future.
The three devices C, R and S are three kinds of devices in SVC system. Stored-value cards C are sold to a large
group client. They should be of light-weight devices, and therefore they provide very limited computation capability.
We assume that this light-weight device cannot shield the computation leakage in the presence of side-channel attacks.
In other words, stored-value cards are tamper-resistant but with weak computation ability and computation leakage.
On the other hand, card readers R are sold to merchants and they can be relatively expensive. We assume card readers
are tamper-resistant with powerful computation capability and leakage resistance. In this work, the top-up machines
S are assumed to be powerful and managed by a trusted server.
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2.3. Security Requirements
A secure stored-value card system must fulﬁl the following security requirements.
Recharge Security. Unauthorized Stored-value cards should be prevented from successfully recharging. Only the
top-up machine S is able to generate valid recharge tokens to recharge SVCs. Meanwhile, a recharge token should be
prevented from double recharging.
Spend Security. Money tokens generated by SVCs should be prevented from illegally forging. A stored-value card
can output a money token if and only if contains a suﬃcient monetary value. Meanwhile, a money token should be
prevented from double spending.
Collect Security. Merchants should be prevented from collecting more monetary amount than they have received
from clients. Let VR be the amount of money received from SVCs , and let VC be the amount of money to be collected.
The security requires VR = VC .
Leakage-Resilient Security. SVCs are light-weight devices and we assume they cannot shield any computation
leakage. Therefore, all accessed data in computation in stored-value cards must be leakage-resilient.
We say that a stored-value card system is secure if the amount of monetary value recharged into SVCs is equivalent
to the amount of money collected from servers. That is, the sum of balance before and after money transactions is
the same. When the recharge security, spend security and collect security all hold, we immediately get that the SVC
system is secure.
2.4. Our Deﬁnition
In our deﬁnition, we assume both card readers and SVCs store a current balance, which cannot be tampered. When
an SVC is recharged, its current balance increases. When a client pays to a merchant, the current balance in the SVC
decreases and the current balance in the card reader increases. According to the ﬁgure 1, a stored-value card system
can be deﬁned as follows.
Setup: In this phase, an algorithm is run by the Issuer. The algorithm setups system parameters for C, S, R. The
current balance in both C and R are initialized with zero.
Recharge: In this phase, an interactive protocol is run by the Client and the Server. Taking as input C, S and a
monetary value Vc to recharge, the protocol increases current balance BC in C as BC := BC + Vc , or outputs fail.
Spend: In this phase, an interactive protocol is run by the Client and the Merchant. Taking as input C, R and a
monetary value V s to pay, the protocol increases current balance BR in R as BR := BR + V s and decreases BC in C as
BC := BC − V s , or outputs fail.
Collect: In this phase, the Merchant collects money from the Server and the monetary amount is BR . Then, Server
resets BR to 0.
3. Preliminaries and Deﬁnition
3.1. Message Authentication Code
A message authentication code (MAC) scheme is composed of the following three algorithms.
KeyGen: On input a security parameter 1λ , the algorithm returns a private key K.
TagCom: On input a message M from the message space and the secret key K, the algorithm returns an authentication
tag τ M = MACK [M].
Verify: On input an authenticated message (M, τ M ) and the private key K, the algorithm returns accept or reject.
A secure MAC scheme should be existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks [11]. The security
notion can be deﬁned using a game model between a challenger and an adversary as follows.
Setup: The challenger runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a private key K.
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Query: The adversary queries a tag on message Mi , which is adaptively chosen. The challenger runs the TagCom

algorithm to generate the tag τ Mi , which is sent to the adversary. Let q be the number of tag queries.

Forgery: The adversary outputs a forged authenticated message (M ∗ , τ M∗ ) and wins the game if the forged tag is

correct on the new message M ∗ that was not queried in the query phase.

Deﬁnition 1. A message authentication code scheme is (t, q, ) existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks if there exists no adversary A who makes q queries at most can forge a valid tag with probability  at least in t
time.
3.2. Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme consists of the following three algorithms.
KeyGen: On input a security parameter 1λ , the algorithm returns a key pair (pk, sk), where pk denotes the public key
and sk denotes the signing key.
Sign: On input a message M from the message space and the signing key sk, the algorithm returns a signature
σ M = Sign sk [M].
Verify: On input a signed message (M, σ M ) and the public key pk, the algorithm returns accept or reject.
The standard security notion [23] for digital signatures is existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks.
A game can be simulated by considering a challenger and an adversary as follows.
Setup: The challenger uses the KeyGen algorithm to generate a key pair (pk, sk), and sends the public key pk to the

adversary.
Query: The adversary queries a signature on message Mi , which is adaptively chosen. The challenger uses the Sign

algorithm to generate the signature σ Mi , which is sent to the adversary. Let q be the number of signature queries.

Forgery: The adversary outputs a forged signed message (M ∗ , σ M∗ ) and wins the game if the forged signature is

correct on the new message M ∗ that was not queried in the query phase.

Deﬁnition 2. A digital signature scheme is (t, q, ) existentially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks if there
exists no adversary A who makes q queries can forge a valid signature with probability  at least in t time.
3.3. Bilinear Pairing and Complexity Assumption
Let PG = (G, GT , p, g, e) be a bilinear pairing group, where G, GT are multiplicative groups of prime order p, g
is a generator of G, and e : G × G → GT is the bilinear map. The bilinear map e : G × G → GT should satisfy that
• For all g ∈ G, a, b ∈ Z p , e(ga , gb ) = e(g, g)ab .
• e(g, g)  1 if g generates the group G.
The bilinear pairing PG deﬁned above is a symmetric pairing. There exists another pairing deﬁnition, named as
asymmetric pairing PG = (G1 , G2 , GT , p, g1 , g2 , e). Here, the bilinear map e is deﬁned as e : G1 × G2 → GT . This
asymmetric pairing is utilized to construct shortest possible signatures. More detailed discussions can be found in
[12, 24].
Our scheme uses the technique of digital signatures [12, 13] which are based on the hardness of Computational
Diﬃe-Hellman problem (CDH). We simply revisit this assumption as follows.
Deﬁnition 3. The CDH problem is (t, )-hard if given g, ga , gb ∈ G for over random choice of g ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z p ,
there exists no adversary who can output gab in t-time with probability  at least.
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4. Our Scheme
4.1. Description
The core of a secure SVC system is the recharge phase and the spend phase. Before presenting our scheme, we
ﬁrst give a high-level description.
We utilize a message authentication code (MAC) to secure the recharge phase. We assume a success recharge
will let the current balance in SVCs increase a ﬁxed monetary value denoted by Vc . To recharge an SVC, the topup machine generates a recharge token (i.e., authentication tag ), and sends it to the SVC. The SVC veriﬁes the
recharge token and increases its current balance when valid. Since the authentication tag of a secure MAC scheme is
unforgeable, no adversary can forge recharge tokens.
We utilize a digital signature to secure the spend phase. We set the money token to be an unforgeable digital
signature. To pay monetary value amount of V s to a merchant, the client uses his SVC to generate the money token
(i.e., signature on V s ). The SVC ﬁrstly checks the current balance BC ≥ V s , then decreases its balance as BC := BC −V s ,
and ﬁnally returns a signature on V s . Upon receiving this money token, the current balance BR in the reader increases
its current balance as BR := BR +V s . Since digital signatures of a secure signature scheme is unforgeable, no adversary
can forge money tokens.
The above descriptions show the basic sketch of applying message authentication codes and digital signatures in
our system. However, they are not secure in this way and the system must be able to withstand double-recharging
attacks, double-spending attacks and side-channel attacks.
Double-recharging attacks. We withstand the double-recharging attacks by utilizing an unique string and an index
for SVCs. Precisely, each SVC is assigned with an unique string IDC and a counter C1 initialized with C1 := 1. To
recharge an SVC, the top-up machine reads its (IDC , C1 ) and generates an authentication tag on (IDC , C1 ). Upon
receiving a recharge token, the SVC reads (IDC , C1 ) and checks the validness of this token on (IDC , C1 ). If valid,
increases its current balance as BC := BC + Vc and increases its counter as C1 := C1 + 1. We have that the unique
string will prevent diﬀerent SVCs from being recharged with the same token, and the update of counter will prevent
the same SVC from being recharged with the same token.
Double-spending attacks. We withstand the double-spending attacks by utilizing an unique string and an index for
readers. The approach is similar to that against double-recharging attacks. Similarly, each reader is assigned with an
unique string IDR and a counter C3 initialized with C3 := 1. To receive a money token amount of V s monetary value
from a client, the reader reads (IDR , C3 ) and sets the message as (IDR , C3 , V s ). Upon receiving a money token (i.e.,
signature) on this message, the reader reads (IDR , C3 ) and checks the validness of this token on (IDR , C3 , V s ). If valid,
increases its current balance as BR := BR + V s and increases its counter as C3 := C3 + 1. We have that the unique
string will prevent diﬀerent readers from accepting the same money token, and the update of counter will prevent the
same reader from double accepting the same money token.
Side-channel attacks. We withstand the side-channel attacks by utilizing pre-computations and an index for SVCs.
The computation in SVCs could leak sensitive information in the recharge phase and the spend phase. In the recharge
phase, all valid recharge tokens have been pre-computed and stored in SVCs, such that there is no computation
requiring the private key and signing key. The SVC only compares bit strings when receiving a recharge token from
outside. A recharge token is valid if and only if it is associated with the current state of (IDC , C1 ), which cannot
be modiﬁed by an adversary. We require the counter C1 to increase as C1 := C1 + 1 when the veriﬁcation fails.
Even all valid tokens are leaked though the bitwise comparison, these tokens are no longer valid because they do not
fulﬁl the current state of (IDC , C1 ). In the spend phase, we construct a new signature scheme modiﬁed from [14] to
pre-compute all money tokens such that the generation of money tokens in SVC will not leak the signing key.
4.2. Construction
We utilize the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme [12] as the MAC scheme, which is provably secure under
the CDH assumption and provides the shortest signature length. We construct a new signature scheme variant from
[13, 14], which is provably secure and computational-leakage resilient under the CDH assumption. Our scheme is
described as follows:
Setup: The Issuer generates system parameters in Steps 1-3.
6

Step 1. The Issuer generates the key K for message authentication and generates the public/signing key pair (pk, sk)
for signature operations.
K = α, pk = (PG, g1 , g2 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un ), sk = gβ2 ,
The MAC scheme is deﬁned as follows. α is randomly chosen from Z p . Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a collisionresistant hash function, where the input is an arbitrary string and the output is an element of the pairing group
G [12]. The MAC function is deﬁned as MACK (M) = H(M)α .
The key pair (pk, sk) is deﬁned as follows. PG is the pairing group. β is randomly chosen from Z p and g1 is set
as gβ . The elements g2 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un are chosen at random from G. The length of messages to be signed is an
n-bit string. We discuss the size n in later sections.
Step 2. The Issuer uses K to compute recharge parameters (RP) and uses sk to compute spend parameters (S P).
RP = (IDC , N1 , C1 , Q1 , Q2 , · · · , QN1 ), S P = (N2 , C2 , P1 , P2 , · · · , PN2 ).
The parameter RP is deﬁned as follows. IDC is an unique string for each C. N1 denotes the maximal number of
times for recharge. C1 is a counter initialized with C1 := 1. Each Qi is computed as
Qi = H(IDC  i)α ∈ G , for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N1 .
The parameter S P is deﬁned as follows. N2 denotes the maximal number of times for spending. C2 is a counter
initialized with C2 := 0. Each Pi for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N2 is independently computed by the Issuer below.
• Choose at random r ∈ Z p and t1 , t2 , · · · , tn ∈ Z p such that
t1 + t2 + · · · + tn = 0

mod p.



• Compute Pi = (s0,1 , s1,1 ), (s0,2 , s1,2 ), · · · , (s0,n , s1,n ), sr , which is deﬁned as


s0,1
s1,1

s0,2
s1,2

s0,3
s1,3

···
···

  β
s0,n
g2 (u0 u01 )r · gt1
, sr =
s1,n
gβ2 (u0 u1 )r · gt1

(u02 )r · gt2
(u2 )r · gt2

···
···


(u0n )r · gtn
r
, g .
(un )r · gtn

Here, we deﬁne u0i = 1G for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Step 3. The Issuer pre-loads C with (BC , RP, S P), S with K, and R with (BR , IDR , C3 , pk) by a secure channel.
Here, the current balance BC , BR are initialized with BC := 0 and BR := 0. IDR is an unique for each reader R.
C3 is another counter initialized with C3 := 1.
All parameters for the stored-value card C, top-up machine S and card reader R are listed in Table 1.
Current Balance
Recharge Parameters
Spend Parameters

C
BC
(IDC , N1 , C1 , Q1 , Q2 , · · · , QN1 )
(N2 , C2 , P1 , P2 , · · · , PN2 )

S

R
BR

K
(IDR , C3 , pk)

Table 1: The uploaded parameters.

Recharge: Let Vc be the amount of monetary value for recharging and ﬁxed for each time. The interaction between
C and S is described in Steps 4-6.
Step 4. C reads and sends Mc = IDC  C1 to S if C1 ≤ N1 . Otherwise, outputs fail.
Step 5. S generates the recharge token τ Mc = H(Mc )α using K and sends it to C. Meanwhile, the Client is charged
with the equivalent monetary value Vc .
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Step 6. C accesses QC1 to verify the correctness of τ Mc = QC1 . If it is equal, increases its balance BC := BC +Vc and
increases its counter by one as C1 := C1 + 1; otherwise, outputs fail and increases its counter as C1 := C1 + 1
only.
The interaction of this phase is given in Figure 2.
C

S

?

4. C1 ≤ N1
Mc = IDC  C1
Mc

−−−−−−−−−→
τ Mc

5. τ Mc = H(Mc )α

←−−−−−−−−−−
?

6. τ Mc = QC1
BC := BC + Vc
C1 := C1 + 1
Figure 2: The description of recharge phase.

Spend: Let V s be the amount of monetary value to pay. The interaction between C and R is described in Steps 7-9.
Step 7. R reads (IDR , C3 ) and sends M s = IDR  C3  V s to C.
Step 8. C outputs fail if C2 + 1 = N2 . Otherwise, C checks its current balance BC . If BC ≥ V s , C decreases its
balance BC := BC − V s , increases its counter C2 by one as C2 := C2 + 1 and generates the money token σ Ms for
R using PC2 ; otherwise, outputs reject.
The signature σ Ms is generated as follows. Let the message M s = m1 m2 · · · mn be an n-bit string and PC2 be


s0,2
s0,3 · · ·
s0,n
s0,1
, sr .
PC2 =
s1,1
s1,2
s1,3 · · ·
s1,n
C accesses smi ,i and sr for all i, and outputs the signature σ Ms .


σ Ms = sm1 ,1 , sm2 ,2 , · · · , smn ,n , sr .
Step 9. R uses pk to verify the money token σ Ms of M s . If the signature is correct, increases the balance BR :=
BR + V s and increases its counter by one as C3 := C3 + 1; otherwise, outputs reject and increases its counter
as C3 := C3 + 1 only. The veriﬁcation is computed as follows. Given (M s , σ Ms ), R computes σ1 = sm1 ,1 ·
sm2 ,2 · · · smn ,n , sets σ2 = sr and checks that
n





i
um
e σ1 , g = e(g1 , g2 )e σ2 , u0
i .
i=1

The interaction of this phase is given in Figure 3.
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R
7. M s = IDR  C3  V s

C
Ms

−−−−−−−−−→
?

σMs

8. C2 = N2
BC := BC − V s
C2 := C2 + 1
σ Ms ← PC2

←−−−−−−−−−−
?

9. σ Ms = Sign sk [M s ]
BR := BR + V s
C3 := C3 + 1
Figure 3: The description of spend phase.

Collect: The Merchant collects BR monetary amount from the Server, and the Server initializes BR with BR = 0.
4.3. Main Features
Eﬃciency. Stored-value cards in our scheme require very small computations. In the recharge phase and spend
phase, they only conduct bitwise comparisons and simple arithmetic operations. Especially, no complex computation
such as exponentiation is required for signature generation using Pi . These simple computations can be deﬁnitely
performed in light-weight cards.
Security. Our scheme is secure and captures all security requirements deﬁned in Section 2. We will prove that
there exists no adversary who can break the sum of balance before and after money transactions in polynomial time
with a non-negligible probability.
4.4. Memory Requirement
The memory requirement of SVCs in our scheme is mainly dominated by Qi and Pi . Let |X| be the length of X.
We estimate that each SVC requires a storage capacity about
N1 |Qi | + N2 |Pi | = N1 |G| + N2 (2n + 1)|G|.

(1)

For a message M s = IDR  C3  V s with an n-bit length to be signed, we can set (say) n = 75. IDR , C3 and V s can
be deﬁned as follows.
• |IDR | = 25. According to our deﬁnition, each R should be assigned with a diﬀerent IDR number. When
|IDR | = 25, it allows 225 diﬀerent readers as the upper bound.
• |C3 | = 35. Each payment request from SVCs will increase the counter C3 by one. We set |C3 | = 35 so that each
R can operate 235 times of money transactions in total.
• |V s | = 15. V s is the monetary value. When it is a 15-bit string, it can represent 215 diﬀerent monetary coins in
payment. For example, let 10 cents be the minimal unit in spending, we have V s ≈ 3, 000 dollars as the maximal
value.
For the pairing group G, we can utilize the asymmetric pairings [24] to reduce the storage. When 80-bit security is
set, it means that the representation of group elements from G is as short as 160 bits in length, i.e., |G| = 160. Putting
n = 75 and |G| = 160 into equation (1), we yield the following result
N1 |Qi | + N2 |Pi | = N1 · 20 + N2 · 3020 (Bytes).

(2)

Now, we describe the choice of N1 , N2 for our scheme. In practice, suppose a client recharges his SVC once for
every week on average and uses four times every day on average. We give the memory requirement in Table 2 for
SVCs depending on the term of validity.
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N1 |Qi | + N2 |Pi |

One Weak

One Month

One Year

Five Years

Ten Years

85 KBytes

363 KBytes

4.5MBytes

22.5MBytes

45 MBytes

Table 2: Memory requirement depending on the term of validity for SVCs.

5. Security Analysis
5.1. Security Model
Let VR be the amount of monetary value recharged into SVCs and let VC be the amount of money to be collected.
We say that a stored-value card system is secure if and only if VR = VC . We use the following model to deﬁne
the security in terms of the sum of balance. The model is interacted between a challenger and an adversary. The
challenger generates C, S, R and the adversary can make queries to them. Our security model allows the adversary
to gain unbounded leakage from C, assuming that only accessed data in computation leaks information. The security
model is deﬁned as follows.
Setup: The challenger generates the keys K and (pk, sk), and pre-loads parameters into C, S, R deﬁned the same as

the setup phase. Then, C, S, R are given to the adversary.

Query. In this phase, the adversary can make queries on the following list.

• Recharge Token. The adversary acts as C and makes a recharge token query to S on the adaptively chosen Mci .
S responds to C by following Step 4. Let the adversary repeat q1 times at most in this phase.
• Money Token. The adversary acts as R and makes a money token query to C on the adaptively chosen M si . C
responds to R by following Step 8. The adversary repeats it for q2 times at most in this phase.
• Recharge On C. The adversary acts as S and makes a recharge request to C. C responds to S by following
Step 4 and Step 6. The adversary repeats it for q3 times at most in this phase.
• Increase On BR . The adversary acts as C and makes a spend request to R. R responds to C by following Step
7 and Step 9. The adversary repeats it for q4 times at most in this phase.
• Leakage Query. The adversary makes leakage queries from C. Observe that the leakage happens only in Step
4, Step 6, and Step 8. Let L be all data used in computation during these steps. L is sent to the adversary.
• Collect Query. The adversary acts as R and makes collect request to the challenger. The challenger responds to
the adversary by following the collect phase.
Win. Let VR be the monetary amount of recharge tokens queried by the adversary and VC be the amount of money to

be collected from the adversary. The adversary wins the game and breaks the security if VC > VR .

Deﬁnition 4. A stored-value card system is (t, q1 , q2 , q3 , q4 , )-secure against the attacks deﬁned in the game, if there
exists no adversary A, who can win the game in running time t with probability  at least after making the queries
deﬁned as above.
5.2. Security Proof
We prove our scheme is secure against attacks deﬁned in the above model. We show that if there exist attacks on
our scheme, we can utilize the attacks to forge valid signatures of the signature schemes [12, 13]. With the security
proofs in [12, 13], we can further program the reduction proofs for reducing the forged signatures to solving the
computational diﬃculty of CDH problem. Since these two schemes are provably secure under the CDH assumption.
Without redundancy, we present the reduction to forging valid signatures only, which are equivalent to solving the
CDH problem.
Theorem 1. Our scheme is (t1 + t2 , q1 , q2 , q3 , q4 , )-secure assuming that
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• The Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme is (t1 , q, ) secure, where q = {q1 , q3 }max .
• The Waters signature scheme is (t2 , q2 , ) secure.
Proof 1. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t1 + t2 , q1 , q2 , q3 , q4 , )-break our scheme. We construct an
algorithm B that breaks the security of the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme (BLS) or the Waters signature
scheme (Wat). The algorithm B receives the challenge public keys from BLS and Wat, its challenge output is a forged
signature of BLS or Wat using the adversary’s ability. The interaction between the algorithm B and the adversary A
is as follows.
Setup. Let (pkB , skB ) be the key pair of the BLS signature scheme and (pkW , skW ) be the key pair of the Wat signature

scheme. B receives pkB , pkW from BLS and Wat, and sets K = skB , pk = pkW . Then, B simulates as C, R, S for the
adversary.

Query. In this phase, the adversary can make queries on the following list.

• Recharge Token. The adversary acts as C and makes a recharge token query to S on the adaptively chosen Mci .
Upon receiving this query, B responds by querying the signature on Mci to the BLS scheme. Let the signature
be SignBskB [Mci ], B sets τ Mci = SignBskB [Mci ] and sends it to the adversary A. We have that B performs a correct
simulation as S in generating recharge tokens.
• Money Token. The adversary acts as R and makes a money token query to C on the adaptively chosen M si .
Suppose it denotes monetary value V si . If BC < V si , B outputs reject. Otherwise, B responds by querying the
signature on M si to the Wat scheme. Let the signature be SignW
skW [M si ] = (σ1 , σ2 ) and M si = m1 m2 · · · mn . B
randomly choose t1 , t2 , · · · , tn−1 ∈ Z p and sets
sm1 ,1 = gt1 , sm2 ,2 = gt2 , · · · , smn-1 ,n-1 = gtn−1 , smn ,n =

σ1
n−1

g

i=1 ti

, sr = σ2 .

σ Msi = (sm1 ,1 , sm2 ,2 , · · · , smn ,n , sr ) is sent to the adversary A as the money token on M si .
There must exist universally random t1 , t2 , · · · , tn ∈ Z p such that
sm1 ,1

=

t1
1 r
gt1 = gβ2 (u0 um
1 ) ·g

smi ,i

=

smn ,n

=

ti
i r
gti = (um
i ) · g for all i = 2, 3, · · · , n-1
σ1
mn r
tn
n−1 = (un ) · g .
g i=1 ti

Therefore, we have that B performs a correct simulation as C in generating money tokens.
• Recharge On C. The adversary acts as S and makes a recharge request to C. Without loss of generality, let the
counter C1 be C1 = i and the message outputted from C be Mci = IDC  i. B checks that τ is a valid signature
on Mci using the public key pkB , and then falls into diﬀerent results.
– τ = SignBskB [Mci ] and τ is queried by B from the BLS scheme. B increases its current balance BC := BC +Vc
and the counter C1 by one;
– τ = SignBskB [Mci ] and τ is forged by the adversary A. B stops this simulation and outputs (Mci , τ) as the
forged signature to break the BLS scheme.
– τ  SignBskB [Mci ]. B rejects the recharge query, increases the counter C1 by one and queries the signature
on Mci to BLS. Let the signature be SignBskB [Mci ].
We have that B performs a correct simulation as C in recharging.
• Increase On BR . The adversary acts as C and makes a spend request to R. B simulates the same as the Step 7
and Step 9. Let the adversary repeat q4 times in this phase. If the money token (M si , σ Msi ) is correct, store it.
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• Leakage Query. The adversary queries leakages from C. Observe that the leakage happens only in Step 4, Step
6, and Step 8, when only accessed data in computation leaks information. Let L be all accessed data during
these steps. L is speciﬁed as follows.
– Step 4. In this step, only C1 , N1 are accessed. B sends them to the adversary;
– Step 6. In this step, C1 , BC , QC1 are accessed. We have that B got QC1 = SignBskB [Mci ] from the above
query phase. B sends them to the adversary;
– Step 8. In this step, only C2 , N2 are accessed besides all elements to compose σ Msi . B sends them to the
adversary;
We have that B performs a correct simulation associated with unbounded leakage from C.
Win. If A wins the game, there must exist one additional signature (stored in R) which was not generated by the
challenger. Otherwise, we have VR = VC . Without loss of generality, let (M s1 , σ Ms1 ) be the additional signature forged
by the adversary. B sets (M s1 , σ Ms1 ) as the forged signature to break the Wat scheme.

This completes our simulation proof. We have proven Theorem 1.
6. Conclusion
Stored-Value Cards (SVCs) are light-weight devices with weak computation capability, and the system for them
should be leakage-resilient against side-channel attacks. We proposed an eﬃcient and secure scheme for SVCs based
on message authentication codes and digital signatures. With the help of pre-computations, only simple bitwise comparisons and arithmetical operations are required in SVCs, and our scheme for SVCs are secure with unbounded
computational leakage resilience. Our scheme is novel for electronic payments capturing both computational eﬃciency and security against side-channel attacks.
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